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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose of the Study 
One of the features for a good tax, to state government 
officials, is that a large share of the tax burden is exported (Olson, 
1984). Public finance economists have addressed, at some length, the 
ability of states to export a portion of their tax burden. The 
theoretical analysis by Mclure (1964, 1969, 1970, 1978), Gillis 
(1978), and McDonald (1980) has suggested that a state is likely to 
impose a tax on a natural resource if 
l. its market share of the taxed resource is significant, and 
2. its export demand curve is inelastic relative to its supply 
curve. 
Under these circumstances, a state can export a portion of such a 
tax to other states. A state with a rich endowment of a natural 
resource is likely to use the natural resource as a vehicle for 
exporting the tax to other states in order to fulfill the objective of 
maximizing tax exportation (Shelton and Vogt, 1982). 
In 1984, 32 states in the U.S. levied taxes on the extraction of 
natural resources, raising 7.249 billion dollars, about 3.4 percent of 
all state tax revenues. The wide use of taxes on the extraction of 
natural resources can De seen in Table I. As Table I indicates, 8 
1 
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TABLE I 
SEVERANCE TAX REVENUES (Percent of Total State Taxes) 
1970 and 1984 
STATE 1970 1984 
TEXAS 14.2 22.6 
ALASKA 12.5 70.6 
LOUISIANA 29.5 25.3 
OKLAHOMA 11.1 26.4 
WYOMING 5.1 48.4 
NEW MEXICO 13.3 26.7 
KENTUCKY N* 7.5 
NORTH DAKOTA 2.6 29.2 
FLORIDA N 2.2 
MONTANA 3.7 24.8 
ALABAMA N 4.4 
KANSAS N 6.5 
MISSISSIPPI 2.9 5.9 
MINNESOTA 1.9 1.5 
MICHIGAN N N 
Source: Olson, State Taxation of the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Industry, 
Oklahoma State University, January, 1986. 
*N = Less than 1 percent. 
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states now derive over 20 percent of their taxes from levies on 
resource extraction. The increasing trend of imposing severance taxes 
on energy resources to finance state government activities may reflect 
the fact that state governments believe that a portion of these taxes 
can be exported to other states. 
Despite the theoretical importance of exportability for a state, 
however, 1 ittle empirical research has been done to estimate the 
geographic incidence of particular severance taxes for particular 
states. The purpose of this study is to estimate the incidence of the 
Oklahoma severance tax on natural gas. Although some empirical 
estimates of the exportation of Oklahoma•s severance taxes have 
been made by McLure ( 196 7), Phares (1980), and Olson (1984), the 
present study, which stems from Shleton and Vogt•s coal severance 
taxes model (1982), differs from these studies in that 
1. it estimates the tax burden through use of a market 
equilibrium model, 
2. it covers a longer period of time, 
3. it incorporates important changes of economic situation and 
governmental policy in the model, and 
4. it not only estimates the tax exportation ability of state 
government of Oklahoma but also estimates the tax share that falls on 
resident buyers within Oklahoma. 
Methodology of the Study 
Two empirical models are developed in this study in order to 
estimate the incidence of the severance tax on natural gas in both the 
intrastate and interstate natural gas markets. These models are 
4 
constructed within a formal supply and demand framework which 
incorporates the most important determinants of the demand for and the 
supply of natural gas. Two reduced form equations derived from the 
demand and supply models are estimated, using ordinary least square 
techniques. Certain parameters of the estimated reduced form 
equations yield information about the incidence of the severance tax 
on n at u r a 1 gas • 
Organization of the Study 
The chapters of this study are organized as follows. Chapter II 
presents some information about the tax structure of Oklahoma and the 
natural gas industry. Chapter III presents the theoretical background 
of this study and reviews some relevant previous studies. Chapter IV 
presents the empirical models. Chapter V presents the empirical 
results of the study. Chapter VI provides a brief summary and 
conclusions of the study. 
CHAPTER II 
SEVERANCE TAXES IN OKLAHOMA AND THE 
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide background 
information for the theoretical and empirical analysis of the natural 
gas industry presented later in this study. This chapter consists of 
four sections. The first section provides a brief description of the 
severance taxes imposed in Oklahoma and of Oklahoma•s tax structure. 
The second section gives an overview of the natural gas industry. The 
third section describes the natural gas markets and section four 
outlines governmental policy concerning the natural gas industry. 
Severance Taxes and the Tax Structure 
of Oklahoma 
The Imposition of Severance Taxes 
The State Government of Oklahoma imposes a variety of taxes on 
oil and gas producers. The most important of these are the gross 
production tax, the corporation income tax, the general sales tax, and 
the corporation franchise tax. The gross production tax includes 
three different taxes: the severance tax, the gas conservation excise 
tax, and the petroleum excise tax (Olson, 1986). 
5 
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Severance taxes are levied on extractors of natural resources 
either on a per unit (a fixed amount per physical unit produced) or an 
ad valorem (a percentage of the dollar value produced) basis. 
Oklahoma imposes an ad valorem severance tax on the gross revenue from 
the production of petroleum, natural gas, mineral oil, casinghead gas, 
asphalt, and on ores bearing lead, zinc, gold, silver, copper, and 
uranium. 
The first severance tax on oil and gas was imposed in 1910 with a 
rate of 0.5 percent of gross revenues. This rate was raised to 0.75 
percent in 1913, to 3 percent in 1916, and to 5 percent in 1935. In 
1971, the rate was raised to the current level of 7 percent on the 
gross value of petroleum, mineral oil, natural gas, and casinghead 
gas, except for stripper wells where the tax rate is 5 percent of the 
first $150 of value produced in each month with the balance taxed at 7 
percent. 
A 0.75 percent tax rate is levied on the gross value of 
production of asphalt and on ores bearing lead, zinc, gold, silver, 
and copper. A 5 percent tax is levied on uranium-bearing ores. 
The Tax Structure of Oklahoma 
Most of Oklahoma•s severance tax collections come from levies on 
oi 1 and gas production. The importance of tax revenues for Oklahoma 
can be seen in Table II. While the total amount of revenues from 
severance taxes increased from '20.3 million dollars in 1950 to 690.5 
m i 11 ion dollars in 1984, the percentage of severance tax revenues as a 
percentage of total taxes rose from 14.6 percent in 1950 to 25.2 
7 
TABLE II 
SEVERANCE TAX REVENUES, FOR SELECTED FISCAL YEARS, 1950-1984 
FISCAL AMOUNT AS PERCENT OF 
YEAR ($millions) TOTAL STATE TAXES 
1950 20.329 14.6 
1955 28.632 15.4 
1960 32.400 13.5 
1965 37.794 12.2 
1970 49.350 11.1 
1975 128.113 18.7 
1980 404.823 24.1 
1984 690.535 25.2 
Source: Olson, State Taxation of the Oklahoma Oil and Gas Industry, 
Oklahoma State University, January, 1986. 
8 
percent in 1984, indicating that state government relied more and more 
on severance tax revenues in recent years. 
In the 1950's and 1960's, severance tax collections grew slowly 
due to the relatively stable prices of oil and natural gas. In that 
period, prices grew moderately and there was a downward trend in oil 
production. During the period of 1970-1984, severance tax revenues 
grew more rapidly than total state taxes, primarily as a consequence 
of the 1 a r g e increases w hi c h occurred in wor 1 d oil and domestic 
natural gas prices. Table III shows the average annual growth rates 
in state tax revenues for different taxes in different time periods. 
Table III reveals the growth rates of the major taxes for the 
periods 1950-1960, 1960-1970, 1970-1980, and 1980-1984. The most 
striking feature of the change in Oklahoma's tax structure is the 
rapid increases in revenues from severance and income taxes for the 
period 1970 to 1984, as compared to the decades of the 1950's and 
1960's. By contrast, growth of revenue of selective sales taxes 
remained very stable during the entire 1950-1984 period. Growth in 
revenues from the general sales tax during the 1970-1984 period falls 
between the explosion in severance and income tax revenues and the 
stable selective sales tax revenues. 
The relative importance of major tax sources over time is 
illustrated in Figure 1. Because state tax sources have grown at 
different rates since 1950, the relative importance of these taxes 
have also changed since then. Selective sales taxes are still an 
important source of state tax revenues, but their relative importance 
has declined from 44.6 percent in 1950 to 16.9 percent in 1984. The 
relative decline in selective sales tax collections during the 1970's 
TABLE II I 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE IN STATE TAX REVENUES 
1950-1960; 1960-1970; 1970-1980; 1980-1984 
1950 1960 1970 
1960 1970 1980 
Total State Tax Revenue 5.5 6.5 13.9 
Seletive Sales Tax* 5.6 5.9 6.1 
General Sales Tax 5.0 5.4 7.1 
Severance Tax 5.1 4.2 11.1 
Income Taxes 5.8 10.7 11.6 
Other Taxes 7.6 8.0 7.9 
9 
1980 
1984 
11.0 
5.5 
10.6 
14.2 
14.9 
7.4 
Source: Sandmeyer, Wasson, and Greer, Report: A Study of Oklahoma 
State Taxes, Oklahoma State University, February, 1979; 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
Survey of Current Business, August, selected years. 
*Selective sales tax include the following taxes: motor fuels, 
alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, insurance premium, public 
utilities, and motor vehicle excise taxes. 
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Figure 1. Major Taxes as Percent of Total Taxes, By 
Year, 1950-1984 
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has been more than offset by the relative increase in severance and 
income taxes. 
The Use of Severance Taxes 
Severance tax revenues have been earmarked by previous 
legislation for particular purposes in Oklahoma. Table IV shows that 
percentage prescribed by law that is apportioned to particular 
purposes in Fiscal Year 1984. Over half of total severance tax 
revenues were earmarked for the General Revenue Fund and used 
principally to finance common schools, colleges and universities, 
highways, and prisons. Over 25 percent was used to finance retirement 
programs of state employees. These percentages will change with 
changes in the relative importance of oil and natural gas production. 
If natural gas assumes a more important role in the future and the 
apportionment formula remains unchanged, a growing percentage of 
severance tax revenues wi 11 be apportioned to retirement programs 
( 01 son, 1986 ) • 
The Natural Gas Industry 
The natural gas industry has been described as the invisible 
industry---the gas is colorless and odorless, comes from reservoirs 
deep in the earth, and moves to market in ouried pipelines. The 
industry delivered about one-fourth to one-third of the energy 
consumed in the United States in past decades (Table V). Most of the 
gas produced in the United States originates in the West South Central 
region, in particular in the Gulf Coast states of Texas and Lousiana, 
TABLE IV 
APPORTIONMENT OF SEVERANCE TAX REVENUES, BY PERCENTAGE, FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984 
- - Apportioned To - - - -
Local 
General 
Revenue Fund 
OK 
Ret. Fund 
Pension Syst School County OK Tax 
Tax On Reserve Fund Districts Roads Comm. Fund 
OIL 
Percent 84.28 7.14 7.14 
NATURAL GAS 
Percent 28.57 <--------55.71~-------> 7.14 7.14 
Source: Olson, State Taxation of the Oklahoma Oil ancf(ras Industry, Oklahoma-State 
University, January, 1986. 
1.43 
1.43 
aThe first $125 million of this portion of revenues from natural gas goes to the Oklahoma 
Teachers Retirement Fund. The remainder is allocated to the Pension System Reserve Fund. 
....... 
N 
Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1984 
Source: 
TABLE V 
CONSUMPTION OF ENERGY BY SOURCE FOR SELECTED YEARS, UNITED STATES 
(Tri 11 ion BTU) 
Natura 1 Gas 
Nuclear Hydro- Consumption As % 
Electric Electric of Total Energy 
Coal Natural Gas Petroleum Power Power Other Total Consumption 
9831.5 12385.4 19919.3 6.0 1656.8 2.3 43795.6 28 
11582.2 15 768.7 23245.7 43.2 2057.6 7.0 52685.9 29 
12268.4 21794.7 29521.6 239.3 2654.1 15.0 66435.6 32 
12655.2 19947.3 32732.2 1899.8 3129.0 72.2 70539.1 28 
15451.2 20394.8 34204.4 2739.2 3117.5 114.3 75086.4 26 
17012.2 18504.6 31053.1 3538.4 3774.0 174.2 74045.1 25 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, State Energy Data 
Report Consumption Estimates, 1960-1984, Washington, D.C.: 
Office, April, 1986. 
Government Printing 
..... 
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while markets are distributed more uniformly throughout the U.S. The 
s o u t h we s t s t ate s of N e w Me x i c o , 0 k 1 a h om a , K an s as , T ex as , and 
Louisiana, accounted for nearly 80 percent of marketed U.S. production 
in 1984 as shown in Table VI and, consequently, supply pipelines are 
concentrated in the Southwest. Figure 2 shows the principal 
interstate natural gas flows. As this figure shows, gas is not only 
consumed in the area near to the producing states, but also moves over 
some very long distances from the Southwest into New England, 
California, and the upper Midwest. While most parts of tne United 
States are now served by a natural gas pipeline and while consumption 
is national, natural gas production and transportation are important 
regional industries rooted firmly in the southwestern United States. 
The Development of the Natural Gas 
Pipeline Industry 
The first natural gas company in the United States was formed in 
1858 in fredonia, New York. Natural gas had been discovered by chance 
as it seeped to the surface, and was used to light homes and inns in 
the Fredonia area. The Fredonia Gas Light Company distributed and 
sold the gas to homes and businesses for lighting. Due to the limited 
technology, early attempts at long distance transmission of gas were 
mostly failures. 
In 1872, natural gas was first shipped over a significant 
distance to homes in Titusville, Pennsylvania. The gas entered 
Titusville through a 2-inch, cast-iron pipeline from a well five miles 
to the north. The technology for moving gas gradually improved 
4,000 ·' - •• : :.-.!\ 3 000{.,•.-,e·.·._..:.,r.. 
2'ooo{~S:}~'hV'i:.· 
1 :~gg;@:)J.~~~j:;~ 
le3S lhan 50/ 
Source: U.S. Deparment of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas Annual 
1984, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December, 1985. 
Figure 2. Principal Interstate Natural Gas Flow Summary, 1984 
....... 
CJ1 
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TABLE VI 
MARKETED PRODUCTION OF NATURAL GAS BY MAJOR PRODUCING STATE, 1984 
PRODUCING QUANTITY AS PERCENT OF 
STATE (Millions of cubic feet) DOMESTIC PRODUCTION 
LOUISIANA 5,825,055 30.3 
TEXAS 6' 185 '021 32.3 
OKLAHOMA 1' 985,869 10.3 
NEW MEXICO 957' 366 5.0 
KANSAS 465,979 2.4 
OTHER STATES 3,810,335 19.8 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 
Natural Gas Annual 1984, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, December, 1985. 
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through the nineteenth century. Originally, natural gas was used only 
in the vicinity of its discovery, and markets were limited by the lack 
of long distance transportation. 
The discovery and use of natural gas followed the path of early 
oil wildcatters from Pennsylvania and West Virginia into the Lima 
field of Indiana and Ohio. These wildcatters would have regarded 
natural gas as a complete nuisance if it had not often been a sign 
that oil was nearby. When a gas well was discovered without producing 
o i 1 , t h e g a s w a s e i t h e r v e n t e d i n t o t h e a i r or f 1 are d wh il e the 
wildcatter moved on. Industrial customers were among the first to 
recognize the potential value of Appalachian natural gas as a fuel and 
began piping gas into their plants from nearby wells. In 1883, the 
Chartiers Valley Gas Company became the first company to produce, 
gather, and transmit gas to industrial users---several large 
Pittsburgh industries. The recognition of the value of natural gas 
1vas followed by the construction of a considerable network of 
gathering and transmission lines throughout the Appalachian oil and 
gas fields. 
In the 1920's, the elements that would shape the modern gas 
industry were put into place: ready markets for natural gas; the 
discovery of huge fields in Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and Louisiana; 
producing states' enactment of conservation laws to stop the flagrant 
waste of natural gas; and the development of welded pipe capable of 
sustaining high pressures. 
The natural gas business continued to follow the route of the oil 
wildcatters after the turn of the century, and discoveries of 
oil-associated gas and small gas fields were made through eastern 
18 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and North Texas. More important, however, was the 
discovery in 1918 of the Panhandle field forty miles north of 
Amarillo, Texas, and the Hugoton field in 1919 near Liberal, Kansas. 
These were major gas fields---giant reserves of dry natural gas in 
extreme horizontal and vertical traps, offering stable, long-term 
source of supply. Stability and duration were critical to an industry 
making huge, long-term investments in transmission equipment to move 
the gas out of the fields. 
Conservation laws adopted to prevent waste of the fuel also 
h e l p e d t o a s s u r e t h e s t a b i l i t y an d c o n t i n u a t i on of n at u r a 1 gas 
supplies. In 1915, Oklahoma became the first state to prohibit 
physical and economic waste and to give broad regulatory powers over 
petroleum to a state conservation commission. All of the major 
petroleum-producing states followed; Kansas 1vas the last to establish 
regulatory authority in 1935. Conservation laws lent certainty to 
the 1 ife of natural gas supplies and encouraged investments in 
gathering lines and transmission equipment. 
The technology of natural gas transmission is superficially 
simple, requiring pipe, compressors to increase pressure in the pipe 
and to move the gas, and regulators to reduce high pipeline pressures 
for local distribution. This technology matured slowly, however, and 
the first real breakthrough toward reducing leakage and allowing 
high-pressure shipments finally occurred in the mid-1920's. In the 
year of 1925, Magnolia Petroleum Company replaced the old-style bolted 
p i p e 1 i n e s e a 1 e d b y r u b b e r c o u p 1 i n g s w it h an a 1 1 -we l de d p i p e t h at 
greatly reduced leakage. The Magnolia line moved gas about 200 miles 
from north Louisiana to Beaumont, Texas. The Magnolia line was 
19 
quickly copied and improved upon. In 1926, the Interstate Natural Gas 
Company constructed a 22-inch pipeline over the 170 miles from Monroe, 
Louisiana, to Baton Rouge. By 1931, the first 1,000-mile pipeline was 
being built from the Texas Panhandle to Chicago. 
At the end of World War II, the elements necessary for sustained 
growth of the natural gas pipeline industry---strong economic growth, 
available credit, proven technology, and the continued discovery of 
new reserves in the Southwest---came together for the first time since 
1930. Southwestern gas production clearly dominated that of other 
regions of the country (Table VII). Pipelines reached into the 
Southwest from many parts of the United States, often opening new 
markets for the industry. 
The growth of the natural gas industry may be most easily judged 
by comparing it with the more visible railroad industry. In 1983, the 
natural gas industry was nearly twice as big as the railroad industry 
on the basis of book value; its annual operating expenses were 
one-third larger than those of the railroad industry; and there were 
more miles of long-distance gas transmission pipelines crossing the 
country (250,000 miles) than there were miles of railroad track. 
The Natural Gas MarKets 
Before natural gas is consumed by end-users, it passes through 
several markets: a) the drilling market; b) the wellhead market, c) 
the resale market, and d) the end-use market. Each of these has its 
own characteristics and importance to the sale and purchase of natural 
gas. 
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TABLE VII 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETED PRODUCTION OF NATURAL GAS 
BY REGION, 1920-1983 
MARKETED 
PRODUCTION 
YEAR (trillion cubic ft) 
1920 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1983 
.80 
1.19 
1.94 
1. 92 
2.66 
3.91 
6.28 
9.41 
12.80 
16.04 
21.92 
20.11 
19.88 
16.82 
--% DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETED PRODUCTION--
SOUTHWEST CALIFORNIA APPALACHIAN OTHER 
33.9 
47.4 
61.3 
65.2 
68.4 
73.1 
79.9 
85.5 
87.2 
88.2 
90.2 
91.2 
88.2 
85.2 
8.2 
15.7 
17.2 
14.8 
13.2 
12.8 
8.8 
5.7 
4.1 
2.9 
1.7 
1.2 
1.6 
2.5 
54.6 
28.8 
17.2 
16.0 
14.5 
9.8 
6.3 
4.5 
3.4 
2.6 
2.1 
2.1 
2.3 
3.1 
3.3 
8.1 
4.3 
4.0 
3.9 
4.3 
5.0 
4.3 
5.3 
7.6 
4.8 
5.0 
7.9 
11.2 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, Natural Gas Annual and Minerals 
Yearbook, various years, 1920-1975; U.S. Department of 
Energy, Energy Information Administration, Natural Gas 
Annual 1984, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, December, 1985. 
Note: Southwestern states are Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma and Texas. The Appalachian states are Kentucky, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. 
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The Drilling Market 
This market is heavily influenced by the relative prices of oil 
and gas and their current and expected availability. The results of 
drilling activity have major long-term effects on the behavior of 
downstream gas markets because the supplies available in any one year 
are the product of drilling in previous years. When the prices paid 
of newly discovered gas were substantially higher than old supplies in 
the early years of the NGPA*, the effects on downstream markets were 
especially dramatic and prices rose quickly. 
The Wellhead Market 
Most of the United States• gas supplies are purchased in the 
wellhead market from producers by large pipeline companies that 
transport the gas to end-use markets. At the wellhead, the number of 
producers and their relative holdings make the seller•s side of the 
market workably competitive. On the purchaser (pipeline) side of the 
market there may be some regional or local monopsony power; that is, 
some or all producers may have little or no choice of buyers for some 
or all of their production. The wellhead market is characterized by 
the presence of long-term contracts that currently restrict the 
flexibility of pipeline companies to meet demand. 
*The Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) is discussed later in this 
section. 
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The Resale Market 
The majority of natural gas consumed in the nation passed through 
a resale market where local distribution companies purchase gas from 
major pipeline companies. In most cases, distributors have a limited 
number of supply options. Even when a distributor is served by more 
than one pipeline company, there are often contractual restraints on 
the degree to which the distributor can shift purchases from a more to 
a less expensive pipeline company. Most distributors, therefore, have 
little ability to influence the price of the gas they ouy. 
The End-Use Market 
In this market, consumers of gas purchase supplies from 
distrioutors, pipeline companies, and producers. End-users can be 
divided into five types: residential, commercial, industrial with the 
capability of burning alternate fuels, other industrial, and electric 
utilities. Most end-users purchase gas from distribution companies 
t h at h o 1 d a mono p o 1 y fran c h i s e on the r i g h t to f urn ish gas to a 
service territory. These end-users have little or no ability to seek 
a less expensive supplier. In the short-run, theymayreducegas 
purchases by undertaking conservation measures, and in the long-run, 
they may switch to alternative fuels. Nonetheless, in most 
circumstances, their influence over the gas market is slight. Some 
large industrial customers (and a few others) purchase gas directly 
form pipeline companies. These end-users may communicate their 
willingness to buy gas directly to the agents who purchase the gas 
(the pipeline companies). When these direct sale customers can use an 
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alternate fuel (usually residual fuel oil), they can switch fuels and 
affect the pipeline companies directly. A few end-users, accounting 
for about 15 percent of total sales in 1984, buy gas directly from 
producers. They often arrange with a pipeline company to transport 
the gas. This practice has occurred fairly frequently in intrastate 
markets and is becoming more widespread in interstate markets through 
certain industrial sales programs (in which the pipeline company acts 
as broker between producer and end-user). Table VIII shows the 
natural gas consumed by end-users in the United States for 1960-1984. 
Among the end-users, the industrial sector consumes more natural 
gas than any other sector, followed by the residential sector. These 
two sectors account for more than 60 percent of total consumption of 
natural gas in the U.S. in the past two decades (Table IX). In the 
industrial sector, gas was very price competitive on a heat-value 
basis in most areas of the country. The exception was the Southwest, 
which is largely an intrastate market with some very inexpensive gas 
under long-term contracts. This explains the fact that most of the 
Oklahoma natural gas was consumed by the industrial sector and 
electric utilities (Tables X and XI). Sharp oil price increases in 
the middle and late 197o•s rendered residual oil largely uncompetitive 
with natural gas in industrial fuel applications. 
In recent years, the competition of residual fuel oil witil gas in 
the industrial market is back to where it was before 1973. Since the 
price of residual oil was and is highly dependent on the price of 
crude oi 1, which can be subject to wide swings, industrial gas prices 
must be flexible in order to compete in industrial markets. 
YEAR 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1984 
Source: 
TABLE VII I 
CONSUMPTION OF NATURAL GAS IN THE UNITED STATES, 
BY END-USE SECTOR, 1960-1984 
------
-·----Sector--- - - - -
RESIDENTIAL COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL 
- - - - Bill ion cubic feet - -
3,103 1,020 5' 771 
3,903 1,444 7' 112 
4,837 2,398 9,249 
4,924 2,508 8,365 
4,752 2,611 8,198 
4,555 2,524 7,231 
24 
- - - - -
ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES 
1, 725 
2,321 
3,932 
3,158 
3,681 
3,111 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 
State Energy Data Report Consumption Estimates, 1960-1984, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December, 
1985. 
YEAR 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1984 
TABLE IX 
CONSUMPTION OF NATURAL GAS BY END-USE SECTOR, 
AS PERCENT OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION, 
UNITED STATES, 1960-1984 
------ - - - - -Sector- - - - - - -
RESIDENTIAL COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL 
26.7 8.8 49.7 
26.4 9.8 48.1 
23.7 11.7 45.3 
26.0 13.2 44.1 
24.7 13.6 42.6 
26.1 14.5 41.5 
25 
- - - - -
ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES 
14.8 
15.7 
19.3 
16.7 
19.1 
17.9 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 
State Energy Data Report Consumption Estimates, 1960-1984, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December, 
1985. 
YEAR 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1984 
TABLE X 
CONSUMPTION OF NATURAL GAS BY END-US£ SECTOR, 
OKLAHOMA, 1960-1984 
------- - - - -Sector- ------
RES I DENT IAL COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL 
- - - -
Bill ion cubic feet 
60.0 29.0 128.0 
65.0 27.0 236 .o 
77.0 44.0 218.0 
80.0 42.0 223.0 
77 .o 47.0 246.0 
83.8 45.8 282.9 
26 
- - - - -
ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES 
83.0 
127 .o 
235.0 
301.0 
330.0 
232.9 
Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 
State Energy Data Report Consumption Estimates, 1960-1984, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 
1986. 
YEAR 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1984 
Source: 
TABLE XI 
CONSUMPTION OF NATURAL GAS BY END-USE SECTOR, 
AS PERCENT OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION 
OKLAHOMA, 1960-1984 
------ - - - - -Sector- ------
RES IDE NT IAL COMMERCIAL INDUSTRIAL 
20.0 9.7 42.7 
14.3 5.9 51.9 
13.4 7.7 38.0 
12.3 6.5 34.6 
11.0 6.7 35.1 
13.0 7.1 43.8 
27 
- - - - -
ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES 
27.6 
27.9 
40.9 
46.6 
47.1 
36.1 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, 
State Energy Data Report Consumption Estimates, 1960-1984, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 
1986. 
Sections 
SUPPLY 
INCENTIVES 
102 
103 
107 
108 
CONSUMER 
PROTECTION 
104 
106a 
109 
INTRASTATE 
MARKET 
105 
106b 
TABLE XII 
OVERVIEW OF THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978 
Decription 
New natural gas outside 
existing fields; new 
reservoirs; new outer 
continental shelf fields 
New onshore wells within 
existing fields 
High-cost gas 
Stripper wells 
Old interstate gas 
Renegotiated interstate 
contracts 
A 11 other gas 
Intrastate gas 
Renegotiated intrastate 
contracts 
Price 
Escalation 
Formula 
Ann ua 1 in-
flation plus 
real growth 
premium 
Annual 
inflation 
Deregu 1 a ted 
immediately 
Same as 102 
Same as 103 
Same as 103 
Same as 103 
Tied to new 
gas prices 
Same as 103 
Status 
as of 
1/1/85 
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Deregulated 
Deregulated 
Deregulated 
Regulated 
Regulated 
Regulated 
Regulated 
Deregulated 
Deregulated 
if contract 
price is 
greater 
than $1.00 
per thous. 
cubic feet 
Source: The Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget 
Office, Understanding Natural Gas Price Decontrol, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 
1983. 
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The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 
The federal government has regulated the interstate market for 
natural gas since 1938. For many years, as the interstate system 
developed, the market was stable. In 1954, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided that the Federal Power Commission was responsible for 
regulation of wellhead purchases. In the early 1970's, however, 
interstate natural gas prices were still subject to relatively 
stringent cost-oriented pricing standards and were not allowed to 
increase as rapidly as oil prices, and most intrastate gas markets had 
no restrictions on wellhead prices. Higher oil prices favored oil 
rather than gas exploration and the relatively free intrastate gas 
markets meant that new gas discoveries could be bid away from the 
interstate markets. Many interstate pipeline companies were unable to 
meet their sales commitments or to replenish their reserves. 
Curtailments of gas deliveries to customers were widespread during the 
mid and late 1970's. 
The Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) was passed in 1978 to alleviate 
these and other market problems for natural gas. The NGPA of 1978 
combined price controls and deregulation by creating nationwide price 
cei 1 ings and by allowing phased deregulation of certain categories of 
gas. It sought thereby to reduce regulation significantly without 
major dislocations. An overview of NGPA is presented in Table XII. 
As this taole illustrates, the sections of the NGPA can be classified 
into three major categories: those that provide supply incentives; 
those that provide consumer protection; and those that promote 
uniformity in gas markets by regulating intrastate prices. 
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Supply Incentives. The incentive provisions were designed to 
increase the nation•s natural gas supply. In general, newly 
discovered gas, as defined in the NGPA, is allowed to have gradually 
increasing prices projected to reach an assumed equivalent of the 
price of oil by 1985. Thereafter, the wellhead price will be 
decontrolled. Several categories of new gas were defined, each of 
which was given distinct price and decontrol treatment. The section 
102 category covers gas found outside 2.5 miles of an existing well, 
gas found 1,000 feet below the completion depth of an existing well, 
gas from outer continental shelf leases, and production from new 
reservoirs. The price ceilings allow the gas defined by section 102 
to increase in price at the annual rate of inflation plus a real 
growth premi urn. New onshore gas produced within existing fields is 
included in section 103, with its price increasing only at the annual 
inflation rate. Both Section 102 and Section 103 gas were deregulated 
on January 1, 1985. 11 High cost 11 gas is defined in Section 107 to 
include gas from wells drilled below 15,000 feet and gas produced from 
geopressurized brine, coal seams, Devonian shales, and other high-cost 
. 
sources. This gas was decontrolled in 1978. 
Consumer Protection. Consumers were to be protected by 
continued price controls on the gas already in production, termed 11 0ld 
gas ... Section 104 sets the ceiling price for natural gas already 
d e d i c a t e d t o i n t e r s t a t e c om m e r c e • T h e m a x i m u m 1 a wf u l p r i c e i n 
contracts that are renegotiated is determined by the provisions set 
·forth in Section 106 of the NGPA. The Section 106a price is the 
higher of either the contract price in the expiring contract or $0.54 
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per million British thermal units (BTU's), both escalating at the 
annual inflation rate. Section 109 is a catch-all category. Each of 
these categories remains regulated until their gas is exhausted. 
Intrastate Gas Regulation. The last major part of the NGPA 
imposed price controls on intrastate gas to limit the ability of 
intrastate users to bid supplies away from interstate users. For 
Section 105 gas, the price ceilings are tied to new prices (Section 
102). Section 106b includes provisions for setting renegotiated 
intrastate prices that closely follow the methods employed in Section 
106a. Most of the intrastate gas categories were deregulated in 1985. 
In summary, a severance tax has been imposed on natural gas 
producers since 1910 by the state government of Oklahoma. Severance 
tax revenues have played a more and more important role in Oklahoma's 
tax structure in recent years. In 1984, severance tax revenues 
accounted for 25.2 percent of total tax revenues. The natural gas 
industry delivered about one-fourth to one-third of the energy 
consumed in the United States in recent decades. Most of the gas 
produced in the United States originates in the West South Central 
region. Oklahoma, alone, producect about one-tenth of the total in 
1983. Most of the natural gas is delivered by interstate pipeline 
companies to end-users. Except for the Southwest, the industrial 
sector consumes more natural gas than any other sector among the 
end-use sectors. The interstate natural gas market has been regulated 
by the federal government since 1938. In the early 1970's, because 
interstate natural gas prices were not allowed to increase as rapidly 
as intrastate gas prices, intrastate users bid away new gas 
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discoveries from the interstate market. Many interstate pipeline 
companies were thus unable to meet their sales commitments or to 
replenish their reserves. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 was 
passed to alleviate this situation for natural gas markets through 
stimulating the natural gas supply by deregulating some of the natural 
gas wellhead prices, protecting consumers by continuing price controls 
on 11 old gas, 11 and limiting the ability of intrastate users to bid 
supplies away from interstate users by imposing price controls on 
intrastate natural gas. 
CHAPTER I II 
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The main objective of this chapter is to present a theoretical 
analysis of the tax incidence and exportation, since the primary 
purpose of this study is to estimate the portion of the Oklahoma 
natural gas severance tax that is shifted forward to consumers in both 
the intrastate and interstate markets. In this chapter, we start with 
a brief description of the framework adopted in this study, followed 
by a presentation of the general principles of tax incid.ence and 
exportation. Some of the more relevant previous studies are reviewed 
in the last section of this chapter. 
The Framework 
Tax incidence and exportation analysis can be conducted in 
various ways. First, the analysis can be conducted in either a 
unilateral or a multilateral framework. Unilateral analysis, 
according to Morgan and Mutti (1985), considers tax incidence and 
exportation from the perspective of a tax change in only one state, 
while the multilateral approach considers simultaneously the effects 
of changes in tax policies in several states. Second, tax incidence 
analysis can also be conducted using two different approaches: either 
a partial-equilibrium or a general-equilibrium approach. A partial-
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equilibrium analysis focuses on the product and factor markets 
directly affected by the tax. A general-equilibrium analysis also 
considers the possible outcome due to the change of relative prices 
elsewhere in the economy because of the imposition of the tax. A 
partial-equilibrium approach is sufficient to consider the short-run 
effects of a tax policy change if these effects are largely confined 
to the product and factor markets directly affected. But in the 
long-run, when mobile factors enter or leave the taxing state, 
production opportunities and relative prices elsewhere in the economy 
change; as a result, a general-equilibrium approach is more 
appropriate (Morgan and Mutti, 1985). Finally, the incidence of a 
production tax in regu 1 a ted product market is different from what 
would occur if that product market were not regulated. 
The energy crisis of 1973 has encouraged a number of studies of 
en erg y taxes • Most of them have been focused primarily on the impact 
of energy taxes on energy prices and output. Generally, these studies 
were concerned with the allocative effects of energy taxes on the 
production, exploration, and development of primary energy resources, 
or with the incidence and the exportation ability of certain types of 
energy taxes. The present study falls into the category of the latter 
types of studies. 
Most of the tax incidence and exportation studies were conducted 
either in a partial-equilibrium or a general-equilibrium framework 
under the assumption of unregulated product markets. Among the former 
studies, Gillis (1977), Shelton and Morgan (1977), Morgan and Mutti 
( 1981), and Shelton and Vogt ( 1982) used a unilateral approach to 
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analyze the incidence of production taxes, while Church (1981, 1982) 
Zimmerman (1981), and Kolstad and Wolak (1983) adopted a multilateral 
approach. 
The present study is conducted in a part i a 1 - e qui 1 i br i urn, 
unilateral framework; that is, we only consider the incidence and 
exportation of the severance taxes on natural gas in Oklahoma, other 
things being equal. The theoretical background presented in this 
chapter assumes unregulated product markets. Since the natural gas 
markets have long been regulated by the federal government, however, 
the effects of such regulation is discussed in Chapter IV. 
Tax Incidence 
General Principles of Tax Incidence 
and Exportation 
A severance tax is a tax imposed on the production (extraction) 
of energy and natural resources. When a severance tax is imposed on a 
particular resource, producers will try to shift the tax burden to 
buyers in order to avoid paying the tax. In Figure 3, before the tax, 
the e q u i 1 i b r i u m point i s ( Q 0 , P 0 ) , where producers produce Q0 of 
natural gas and consumers pay P0 per unit of natural gas. If an ad 
valorem tax is imposed, the supply curve shifts in the form of a 
swivel from S to s•. fhe new equilibrium point is at (Q1, P1), 
where producers produce Q1 of natural gas, consumers pay P1 per 
u n i t o f n at u r a 1 g as • Th e d i f f e r en c e b e t w e e n P 1 a n d P 2 i s the 
·severance tax. The rate of ad valorem tax equals (P1-P2)/P2" 
The tax revenue received by state government is (P 1-P 2 )*Q 1 , 
PRICE 
0 
s 
QUANTITY PER UNIT 
OF TIME 
Figure 3. Incidence of an Ad Valorem Tax 
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equals to the area a plus b, of which area a is paid by consumers and 
area b is paid by producers. 
The a b i 1 i ty to avoid the tax burden for producers and consumers 
depends on the price elasticities of the supply and demand curve. The 
more elastic the supply curve and the more inelastic the demand curve, 
the more tax burden consumers have to pay. In Figure 4, panel (a) 
shows that with a perfectly elastic supply curve, consumers pay all of 
the tax. On the other hand, the more elastic the demand curve and the 
more inelastic the supply curve, the more tax producers have to pay. 
Panel (b) shows that with a perfectly elastic demand curve, producers 
pay all of the tax. In general, the conditions shown in Figure 3 are 
assumed most realistic, where producers and consumers each pay part of 
the tax. 
Exportation of Tax 
Suppose a state •s objective is to maximize taxes exported for a 
given amount of taxes collected. Under this objective, the state 
attempts to use the natural resource as a vehicle for exporting the 
tax to other states. Such behavior would be possible for a state with 
a rich natural resource endowment. Figure 5 shows a state for which 
the interstate market is the relatively larger market. Od is the 
intrastate demand curve and Ox is the interstate demand curve. OT' 
the horizontal summation of Dd and Ox, is the total demand curve, 
and S is the supply curve. Before a tax is imposed, the total 
quantity demanded is QT, the amount exported to other states is 
Qx, and Qd is the quantity consumed in the state. 
(a) 
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s 
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QUANTITY PER UNIT 
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S' 
s 
D 
QUANTITY PER UNIT 
OF TH1E 
Figure 4. Tax Incidence with Perfectly Elastic 
Supply and Perfectly Elastic 
Demand Curves 
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PRICE 
P' 
s 
QUANTITY PER UNIT 
OF TIME 
Figure 5. Tax Incidence in Intra- and Inter-State Markets 
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The effect of imposing a severance tax can be demonstrated by 
Figure 5. Suppose an ad valorem tax rate has been chosen and the 
supply curve shifts upward to the left from S to S 1 • The new total 
quantity supplied, QT 1 ' is smaller than the initial quantity 
supplied, QT. Quantities supplied to the interstate and intrastate 
markets are Qx 1 and Qd 1 , respectively. The price rises to P1 from 
P, and producers receive P11 • The difference between P1 and pn is the 
severance tax. The ad valorem tax rate is (P 1 -P 11 )/P 11 • The tax 
revenue received by state government is (P 1 -P 11 )*QT 1 ' of which 
(P 1 -P)*Qx 1 is paid by out-of-state residents, and (P 1 -P)*Qd 1 is 
paid by state residents. Thus, (P 1 -P)*Qx 1 /(P 1 -P 11 )*QT 1 is the 
portion of the tax exported to non-residents. In general, the more 
dominant the state in the interstate market, the greater the ability 
of the state to export its tax. The way a state exports its tax 
through higher prices in interstate markets is called 11 forward 
shifting 11 because the tax incidence falls directly on consumers in 
other states. A state with more dominant power in interstate markets 
is more likely to pursue a goal of maximizing taxes exported. 
The rest of the tax revenue, (P-P 11 )*QT 1 ' is paid by producers 
or owners of mineral rights, that is, the tax is shifted backward to 
producers or mineral rights owners. Only when producers or mineral 
rights owners happen to be out-of-state residents, will this portion 
of tax be exported. The effects of backward shifting would be to 
reduce economic rents, profits, or other resource payments. 
Short-Run and Long-Run Shifting 
In the short-run, the price elasticity of demand for natural gas 
is relatively low due to the limited ability of consumers to secure 
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alternate supplies of natural gas and to switch to substitute fuels. 
This means that a substantial part of the severance tax will be 
shifted forward to consumers in the short-run. The upper limit to the 
portion of the tax exported in this way for the state is the 
proportion of natural gas exported (Olson, 1984). 
In the long-run, the state will probably be able to export a 
sma 11 er percentage of natural gas severance tax due to the increasing 
ability of consumers to find alternate sources of natural gas or to 
switch to alternate fuels. The long-run demand curve becomes more 
elastic, 1 imiting the ability of producers to shift the tax forward 
through higher prices. 
The tax that is not shifted forward must either fall on the 
producers or to owners of mineral rights. In general, in the 
long-run, the tax will be shifted to the least mobile resource, the 
mineral rights owners. Only when these owners are non-state-residents 
can the severance tax be exported to other states in the long-run. 
Deductibility from Federal Taxes 
When state government imposes severance taxes, it will receive 
a 11 of the revenues from these taxes. But not a 11 of these taxes are 
paid by consumers, producers, and mineral rights owners. Severance 
taxes are deductible from some federal taxes, such as the federal 
windfall profits tax, and the federal corporate and personal income 
taxes. In regard to natural gas, no windfall profit tax is imposed by 
the federal government for the time being. State severance taxes 
reduce corporation profits, however, and hence reduce the tax base of 
the federal corporate income tax. Since part of after-tax corporation 
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profits are distributed to individuals who must pay the federal 
personal income tax, state severance taxes indirectly reduce the 
federal personal income tax base. The amount by which federal taxes 
fall depends on the federal marginal tax rates on corporate and 
personal income and the percentage of corporate profits after taxes 
distributed as dividends. The following example demonstrates the 
exportation of state severance taxes via the deductibility of federal 
taxes (derived from Olson, 1984). 
Suppose the state imposes a 7 percent ad valorem tax on natural 
gas produced by a corporation with $100,000 of before tax profit. The 
marginal tax rates for the federal corporate income tax and the 
federal personal income tax are assumed to be 46 percent and 40 
percent, respectively. Fifty percent of after tax corporate profits 
are assumed distributed to stockholders as dividends. 
The portion of the state severance tax exported to federal 
taxpayers through the deductibility of the federal corporate income 
tax is: 
{(100,000*.46)-[(100,000-7,000)*.46]} 
7,000 = • 46 
The portion of the state severance tax exported to federal 
taxpayers through the deductibility of the federal personal income tax 
is: 
{[100,000*(1-.46)]*.5*.4)-{(100,000-7,000)*(1-.46)*.5*.4} 
7,000 = .108 
The 46 percent and 10.8 percent figures in the above example 
represent the deductibility of state severance taxes from federal 
taxes. Hence, we may say that out of every dollar of state severance 
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taxes, 56.8 cents {=.46+.108) is exported to federal taxpayers via tax 
deductibility. 
I n s u m m a r y , t h e r e a r e t h r e e w a y s t o e x p o r t s e v e r an c e tax 
incidence for a state government: 
1. through higher prices to consumers in other states, 
2. through tax deductibility of federal taxes, and 
3. through backward shifting to non-resident mineral owners. 
In the short-run, the tax is exported in large part by route (1); in 
the long-run, it is done via route (3). Route (2) is relevant in both 
the short-run and the long-run. 
Review of Previous Studies 
The Ability to Tax a Natural Resource 
Most of the studies about the ability of a state government to 
export a tax on a natural resource agree that the most important 
determinant of that ability is the market dominance of the taxed 
resource by the taxing state (Gillis, 1979; Hogan and Shelton, 1973; 
McDonald, 1980; Mclure, 1978, 1981; and Morgan and Mutti, 1981). A 
state is more likely to tax its natural resource if it is one of the 
few producing states than if there are many states producing that 
natural resource (Mclure, 1978), to import a higher tax rate if it 
dominates the supply of that resource (Gillis and Mclure, 1975), and 
to impose a tax on a natural resource if it can export the tax to 
other states (Richardson and Scott, 1983). 
Richardson and Scott (1983) note that state severance tax rates 
and collections from mineral resources are related to the industrial 
44 
structure of the extracting industry and geographic resource location 
patterns. The industrial structure of the extracting industry is 
critical in determining how much revenue a state can collect from any 
specific severance tax. A state, they claim, if it is the sole state 
in which a resource is located, can collect more revenue if there are 
many extractive firms within the state as opposed to if there is only 
one such firm. This is because the monopolist tends to restrict 
output---and thus the tax base---to levels lower than in the 
competitive market structure. On the other hand, the geographic 
resource location patterns are also related to the state's power to 
tax. The generally accepted hypothesis, they point out, is that the 
more dispersed the resource across states, the less likely that a 
state can effectively tax the resource. Or, alternatively, the more 
concentrated the resource is geographically, the more likely that a 
state can effectively tax the resource. Table XIII sufliTlarizes the 
generally accepted theoretical conclusions. 
According to Richardson and Scott's investigation, there are 
about 30 states producing measurable natural gas and the four-state 
concentration ratio is 85.3. Among the producing states, 27 states 
impose a severance tax on natural gas and eight of them have tax rates 
equal or over 5 percent. Markham (1978), calculates the four-firm 
concentration ratio for oil and gas production companies to be 25.1 
percent. Such a concentration ratio is typically associated with a 
low probability of interdependence among the firm (Bain, 1972). These 
characteristics place the natural gas industry in approximately the 
middle cell of the top row in Table XIII. Hence, when examining 
n at u r a 1 g as s e v e r an c e t ax r a t e s a c r o s s t h e U • S . , we wo u 1 d f i n d 
TABLE X I II 
STATE'S SEVERANCE TAX POTENTIAL FOR SPECIFIC RESOURCE 
Number of Firms 
in Industry 
Many 
Few 
One 
Source: Richardson 
Severance 
Number of States 
in Which Resource is Located 
Many Few 
Poor Fair 
Poor Fair 
Poor Fair 
and Scott, "Resource Location Patterns 
Taxes: Some Empirical Evidence, 11 
Resources Journal, 23(2), April, 1983. 
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One 
Excellent 
Good 
Good 
and State 
Natural 
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1. rates are higher than on most of the other taxed resources, 
2. there are differential rates across states, and 
3. a large proportion of the producing states levying the tax. 
In summary, a state's power to tax a natural resource is related 
to the industrial structure of that extracting industry and geographic 
resource location patterns. The empirical evidence supports the 
general hypothesis that the more concentrated the geographical 
1 ocat ion of a natural resource, the greater a state's power to levy a 
tax on that resource. 
The Ability to Export a Tax 
Mclure (1978) considers that the four determinants of the ability 
of a political jurisdiction to export its taxes are 
1. the degree of dominance of the relevant market by the taxing 
jurisdiction, 
2. the elasticity of demand for the taxed resource, 
3. the mobility of production factors, and 
4. the industrial structure of the market. 
Mclure claims that it is unlikely that a state with a small share of 
the national market for a given natural recourse would be able to 
export a severance tax on that resource to consumers in other states 
through higher prices for the resource. It would oe prevented from 
doing so by competition from untaxed suppliers in other states. It is 
more likely that the tax could be born in the short-run by the owners 
of the firm extracting the resource and in the long-run, when 
contracts are renegotiable, by owners of deposits of the resource. If 
the owners of the firms in the industry or the owners of the resource 
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deposits happened to be non-residents of the taxing jurisdiction, the 
tax could very well be exported, but the exporting could not be to 
consumers, as commonly expected. 
McLure ( 1981) stresses the importance of the elasticities of 
demand and supply and the market shares of the taxing and non-taxing 
states. Suppose a severance tax is levied on only one state, the 
fraction of the tax that will be reflected in higher prices, and 
therefore potentially exportable to consumers in other states, F, is 
given by the following expression: 
ast 
F = * s + 0 
s 
(3.1) 
where 
S = the elasticity of the aggregate supply curve, 
0 =the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve (defined to be 
non-negative), 
st = the elasticity of supply in the taxing state, 
sn = the elasticity of supply in the rest of the country, 
a = the fraction of national output produced in the taxing state, 
S = the fraction of national output produced in the rest of the 
country. 
For non-negative values of stand sn, the value ofF lies 
between zero and one. 
If the taxing state produced the entire national output, a= 1 and 
S = 0, then the expression can be reduced to: 
F = s s + 0 ( 3. 2) 
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On the other hand, if the taxing state produces an insignificant 
fraction of national output, i.e., a approaches zero, then F is also 
insignificant. 
In general a is significantly greater than zero, but 
substantially less than one. For simplicity reasons, McLure assumes 
the elasticities of supply in the taxing and non-taxing states are 
equal. Then F can be expressed as: 
ast 
F s = s + D * 
s 
= * s + D 
= 
s 
* a Since a + s = 1. (3.3) S + D 
The importance of market share of the taxing state can be 
understood from equation (3.3). The larger the value of a, the larger 
the value ofF; that is, the larger the fraction of the tax that the 
taxing state can export. The role of market dominance can be further 
understood by considering the result under the case of perfectly 
elastic supply and/or perfectly inelastic demand. In this case, S ="' 
and/or D = 0. The value ofF is equal to the value of a, the market 
share of the taxing state. Thus, a is the largest value F can have. 
Conrad (1978), who also emphasizes the importance of the elasticities 
of demand and supply and the market shares of the taxing and 
non-taxing states, reaches similar conclusions to Mclure•s. 
Gillis (1975, 1978), not only considers market dominance as a 
determinant of tax incidence, but also claims that dominace can result 
from the coordinated actions of several jointly-dominant states, 
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rather than those of one state. McDonald (1980) points out that if an 
oil severance tax is levied by all producing states, but production is 
confined to a few states only, than the latter jurisdictions can in 
effect shift some of the tax burden to consumers in other states. The 
result is different if an oil severance tax is levied by only one 
state producing a portion of the national output of oil. The state 
confronts a demand curve that is more elastic than the industry curve, 
since the output of other areas is a close substitute for its product, 
and more of the tax is born by land owners in the taxing state in the 
long-run. By tending to raise the relative price of oil in the taxing 
state, the tax increases the demand for oil in other jurisdictions, 
raising prices and increasing land owners• rent. Hence, the burden of 
the tax is born partly by land owners in taxing state and partly by 
consumers in all states, with the incidental effect of increasing 
rents in the non-taxing states. The relative size of these effects 
depends on the share of the industry's capacity accounted for by the 
taxing state. If the share is large, then the state's demand 
elasticity need not differ much from the industry's, rents in the 
state will not decline much in response to the tax, and the increase 
in prices and rents in other states will be relatively greater. If 
the share is very small, the state's demand elasticity will approach 
infinity, rents in the state will bear nearly all of the burden of the 
tax, and the rise in prices and rents in other state will be minimal. 
Finally, Morgan and Mutti (1981, 1985) stress that the regulatory 
environment in which natural gas is produced and sold allows for the 
pass-through of severance (and other) taxes to consumers. 
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In summary, a state's ability to export its severance tax burden 
on natural gas is related to: 
1. the market dominance of the state for the taxed resource, 
2. the elasticity of deamnd for the taxed resource, 
3. the industrial structure of the market, and 
4. regulatory pass-through provisions. 
Implications for Study of the Oklahoma 
Severance Tax 
Intrastate Market 
a. Oklahoma producers are dominant in this market, 
b. historic a 11 y, much of the gas in this market has been sold 
under long-term contract with pass-through provisions, and 
c. there are many Oklahoma gas producers. 
Items (a) and (b) suggest that producers face a relatively inelastic 
demand curve. Item (c) suggests that the intrastate market is 
reasonably competitive. 
Interstate Market 
a. Oklahoma producers are not dominant in this market, 
b. most gas was sold historically under long-term contract, 
c. taxes on gas producers are comparable in size for Oklahoma, 
Texas, and Louisiana (Olson, 1986), and 
d. there are many suppliers. 
Item (a) suggests a relatively elastic demand facing Oklahoma 
producers; items (b) and (c) suggest a relatively inelastic demand. 
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Only empirical analysis can determine which effects are stronger. 
Item (d) suggests that the market is competitive in the absence of 
regulation. 
These conditions suggest that a competitive model can be used to 
analyze the intrastate market, and that a relatively large percent of 
the tax will be shifted forward to consumers. They also suggest that 
a competitive model can be used to analyze the interstate market 
during the recent period of deregulation, and that there is a 
possibility of a large percent of the tax being exported. 
In this study, we examine these markets with aid of an empirical 
model first developed by Shelton and Vogt to examine the incidence of 
a severance tax on coal. These authors use information about the cost 
and quality of each coal shipment received by electric utilities, 
published by the Department of Energy on Form 423, to conduct a formal 
supply and demand analysis to estimate the severance tax incidence on 
western coal-producing states. 
An implicit demand function expresses the quality of coal that 
the utility will purchase as a function of the delivered price and 
other determinants of demand. Hence, the demand function can be 
expressed as: 
Qd = a + bPd+I:c.x.+e (3.4) 1 1 
where 
Qd = the demand for co a 1 by each electric utility, 
pd = the delivered price of coal, 
x. = the other determinants of demand for coal, and 1 
e = the error term. 
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Similarly, an implicit supply function relates each mine's 
desired quantity to minemouth price of coal and other determinants of 
supply can be expressed as: 
where 
Q = a+ 13P + Ir .z. + e: 
s m J J 
Qs = the supply of coal by each coal mine, 
Pm =the minemouth price of coal, 
z. =the other determinants of supply of coal, and 
J 
e: = the error term. 
(3.5) 
The difference between the selling price to consumer and the 
price received by mineowners represents the transportation tariff plus 
the full severance tax. That is: 
Pd = Pm +Tariff+ Severance Tax ( 3.6) 
When a transaction has occurred, desired supply quantity (Qs) 
equals the desired demand (Qd). From a set of observed transactions 
and received prices, they estimate the supply and demand system in the 
reduced form model. Equations (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6) are combined to 
produce: 
where 
and 
Pd =A+ rB.Z. + IC.X. + D {Tariff+ Severance Tax} (3.7) J J 1 1 
A= (a- a)/(b -13), 
B=rj/(b-13), 
Ci = c;f(b - 13 ), 
D = B/ ( 13 - b), 
O<D<l. 
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The share of tax passed forward to utilities is expressed as the 
estimated value of D. The empirical analysis of Shelton and Vogt 
indicates that about 29 to 40 percent of the co a 1 severance taxes are 
passed forward to consumers in other states by the western 
coal-producing states. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL MODELS 
This chapter contains two sections. The first presents the 
market conditions of natural gas before and after the NGPA. The next 
section develops two empirical models based on a formal supply and 
demand framework. 
The Market Conditions of Natural Gas 
As explained in Chapter II, the NGPA was passed in 1978 t.o reduce 
shortages by means of a new regulatory process that would increase 
supplies and reduce demands. Figure 6, taken from MacAvoy (1979), 
i 11 ustrates the market conditions of natural gas before and after the 
NGPA. o2 is intrastate demand, o1 is interstate demand, and total 
demand is 0 = o1 + o2 • The price R is the average regulated 
ceiling price at the wellhead set before passage of the NGPA, and the 
price R1 is the price after the NGPA was enacted. Before 1978, the 
intrastate market was not regulated so that additional supply cleared 
market at P2 for quantity Q2 • But at the regulated price, demand 
in the interstate market, o1 , exceeds its share of the total 
regulated supply, o1 •, leaving Q1 - o1 • as a shortage in 
interstate market. After 197S, the regulated price of gas, R1 , was 
sufficient to clear both markets. 
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Figure 6. Natural Gas Market Conditions Before and After 
the NGPA 
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Suppose an ad valorem tax is imposed, the supply curve shifts 
upward to the left, from S to s•. The equilibrium point of intrastate 
market before NGPA changes from (Q 2 , P2 ) to (Q 2 •, P2 • ). The 
tax paid by state residents is (P 2 •-P 2 )*Q 2 •. After 1978, the 
market clears at (Q 3 , P3 ), the tax revenue that state government 
receives is (P 3 -P 3 • )*Q 3 , of which (P 3-R• )*Q 3 u is paid by 
state residents, (P 3-R• )*Q3• is paid by residents of other states, 
and (R•-p 3 •)*Q 3 is paid by producers. Thus, 
(P 3 -R• )*Q 3 •J(P 3-P 3 •)*Q 3 is the portion of tax exported to 
other states. 
Model Specification 
Two empirical models are presented here based on a formal supply 
and demand framework. Market adjustments due to the imposition of a 
severance tax occur through changes in the pre-tax wellhead price of 
natural gas. Hence, the severance tax incidence that falls on 
consumers can be determined by estimating the difference between the 
equilibrium market price and the sum of the wellhead price and other 
expenses. In each equation, all prices, costs, and taxes of natural 
gas are expressed in terms of dollars per thousand cubic feet and are 
deflated by the implicit price deflator for GNP. 
The Intrastate Model 
The Demand Function. The demand function for natural gas, 
according to Liu (1983), can be expressed as follows: 
D = (4.1) 
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where 
D = the annual total demand for natural gas in Oklahoma, billion 
cubic feet, 
D(-1} = the total demand for natural gas in the previous year 
in Oklahoma, 
PG = the deflated natural gas price in Oklahoma, 
PE =the deflated electricity price in Oklahoma, dollars per 
m i ll ion BTU, 
PO = the deflated #2 oil price in Oklahoma, dollars per mill ion 
BTU, 
GSP = the deflated gross state product of Oklahoma, mill ion 
dollars, and 
u1 = the random disturbance term. 
T h e S u p p l y F u n c t i o n • T h e s u p p l y f u n c t i o n o f n at ural g as , 
according to Akkina and Malhotra (1981), and Moody, Valentine, and 
Krurant (1985), can be expressed as 
(4.2) 
where 
S =the annual production of natural gas in Oklahoma, billion 
cubic feet, 
WP = the deflated wellhead price of natural gas in Oklahoma, 
S(- 1 ) = the one-year-lagged annual production of natural gas in 
Oklahoma, 
TR(-1) = the one-year-lagged total reserves in Oklahoma, billion 
cubic feet, and 
u2 = the random disturbance term. 
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The Reduced Form. The final price of natural gas paid by 
consumers can be expressed as 
PG = WP + TX + OC (4.3) 
where 
TX = the severance tax on natural gas, and 
OC = the operation costs for distributors. 
When the market is at equilibrium, desired supply quantity (S) 
equals the desired demand (D). From a set of observed quantities and 
prices paid by consumers, we can estimate the supply and demand system 
in reduced form. Equations (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) can be combined to 
produce: 
a1-b1 a2 a a5 a 
+ D(-1) + b _: PE + PO + 6 GSP 
PG = b2-a3 b2-a3 2 3 b2-a3 b2-a3 
b2 b b3 b4 
TX + 2 S(-1) - TR(-1) (4.4) + b2-a3 b2-a3 OC - b -a b2-a3 2 3 
or 
PG = A+ZB.X. + Z C . Z . + DTX + DOC (4.5) 1 1 J J 
where 
x. = the determinants of demand, 1 
z. = the determinants of supply, 1 
A 
a1-b1 
= b2-a3 
a. 
B. 1 = b2-a3 1 
b. 
c. = J J b2-a3 
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D = 
and 
O<D<l. 
The Variables. Equation (4.4) indicates the relationship we 
wish to estimate empirically. The relationships between dependent and 
independent variables are explained below. 
1. The one-year-lagged demand (D(- 1)). 
For most of the consumers, an immediate switch to other kinds of 
fuel is quite difficult. The ability to switch is also constrained by 
the long-term contracts that are signed between producers and 
distributors. Thus, the one-year-lagged demand variable (0(- 1)> 
shows some inertia in consumption behavior, at least in the short run. 
2. The price of electricity (PE). 
Electricity is considered to be a substitute for natural gas. If 
the price of electricity rises, we expect the price of natural gas to 
rise through the increasing demand for natural gas. Hence, we expect 
there is a positive relationship between the price of natural gas (PG) 
and the price of electricity (PE). 
3. The price of #2 oil (PO)*. 
#2 oil is also considered a substitute for natural gas. A 
positive relationship is expected between PG and PO. 
*Coal is also considered a substitute for natural gas, however, 
in this study, coal prices are not statistically significant in both 
models. 
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4. The income variable (GSP). 
Higher income will stimulate the consumption of natural gas and 
drive up the price of natural gas. Therefore, we expect there is a 
positive relationship between income and price of natural gas. 
5. The severance tax (TX). 
In equation (4.4), severance tax is measured by the difference 
between the market equilibrium price of natural gas (PG) and the sum 
of wellhead price of natural gas and operation costs. That is, 
TX = PG - WP - OC. 
In normal situations, suppliers have the ability to shift some of 
the tax burden to consu·mers. An increase in severance tax increases 
the price of natural gas. Hence, a positive relationship between PG 
and TX is expected. 
6. The one-year-lagged annual production (S(-1)). 
Most of the natural gas production is sold to pipeline on 
long-term contracts creating inertia in the supply system. We 
incorporate this aspect of gas production into the model through a 
lagged dependent variable. 
7. The one-year-lagged total reserves [TR(-1)]. 
The decision to produce out of existing reserves is limited by 
the total reserves available. Hence, one-year-lagged total reserves 
enter into equation (4.4) to show the production ability of natural 
gas companies is limited by the total reserves available. More 
reserves means more production is possible, which in turn, drives down 
the price of natural gas. Therefore, a negative relationship is 
expected between PG and TR(-1). 
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8. The operation costs (OC). 
The ret a i 1 gas price reflects not only the purchased cost of gas 
(wellhead price), but also the amount transmission and distribution 
companies· must add to cover their costs of doing business. These 
costs include transmission and distribution, storage and 
administration, also known as operation and maintenance costs 
(American Gas Association, 1983). An increase in operation costs 
increases the retail price of natural gas. A positive relationship is 
expected between PG and OC. 
The Test Statistic. The empirical hypothesis to be tested in 
this study is whether or not natural gas severance taxes are passed on 
to consumers. The share of taxes passed forward to consumers is 
ex pres s e d as 
b2 
or b2- a3· 
expected to 
the estimated value of the severance tax coefficient, 0, 
From equations (4.1) and (4.2), b 2 and a 3 are 
be positive and negative, respectively. Hence, the 
estimated value of D must be greater than 0 and is expected to fall 
between 0 and 1. 
The Interstate Model 
Due to prite regulation on interstate markets before 1978, the 
interstate model is tested only for the period after 1978. The 
short-run demand for and supply of natural gas in this market are 
discussed below. 
The Demand Function. The demand function for natural gas is 
similar to the one specified for the intrastate market. It can be 
. expressed as 
where 
o = a1n + a2nGNP + a3nGNP(- 1) + a4nPG + a5nPO + 
a6nPE + a7nDUMD + Uln 
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( 4.6) 
0 = the quarterly total demand for natural gas in the U.S., 
billion cubic feet, 
GNP = the deflated quarterly national gross product, billion 
do 11 ars, 
GNP(- 1 ) = the one-quarter-lagged deflated quarterly national 
gross product, 
PG = the deflated U.S. average natural gas price, 
PO= the deflated #2 oil price in the U.S., dollars per gallon, 
PE =the deflated electricity price in the U.S., cents per 
kilowatt hour, 
DUMD = the dummy variable; 0 for 2nd and 3rd quarter of a year, 1 
for 1st and 4th quarter of a year, and 
uln = the random disturbance term. 
The Supply Function. The short-term supply function, according 
to Richardson and Scott (1979), can be expressed as: 
S = b1n + bznWP + b3nwP(- 1) + b4nPWG + b5nTC + Uzn (4.7) 
where 
S = the quarterly total supply of natural gas in the U.S., 
billion cubic feet, 
WP = the deflated U.S. wellhead price of natural gas, 
W P ( _ 1 ) = the de f 1 ate d U . S • we 1 1 head price of natura 1 gas in 
previous quarter, 
PWG =the number of producing gas wells, 
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TC =the total operating cost of gas wells, million dollars, and 
u2n = the random disturbance term. 
The Reduced Form. The final market price of natural gas paid 
by end-users can be expressed as: 
PG = W P + T X + OC ( 4 . 8 ) 
where 
TX = the severance tax on natural gas, and 
OC = the operation costs for distributors. 
The reduced form becomes: 
a1n-b1n a2n a a 
+ GNP + 3n GNP(-1) + 5n PO PG = 62n-a4n b2n-a4n b2n-a4n b2n-a4n 
a6n a7n b b 
+ PE + DUMD + 2n TX + 2n oc b2n-a4n b -a b -a b2n-a4n 2n 4n 2n 4n 
b3n WP(-1) - b4n PWG b5n TC (4.9) b2n-a4n b2n-a4n - b2n-a4n 
or 
PG = An + L: B. X . + L: C . Z . + D TX + D OC 1n 1n Jn Jn n n (4.10) 
where 
X in = the determinants of demand, 
zjn = the determinants of supply, 
A = 
a. 
8in 
1n 
= 
b2n - a4n 
b. 
cjn = Jn b2n - a4n 
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and 
O<D<l. 
The Variables. The relationships between dependent and 
independent variables in equation (4.9) are explained below. 
1. The gross national product (GNP). 
As explained in the intrastate model, higher income will 
stimulate the consumption of natural gas and drive up the price of 
natural gas. A positive relationship is expected between GNP and PG. 
2. The one-quarter-lagged national gross product (GNP(-l)). 
The trend of consumption behavior might not be changed in a short 
period of time. Thus, an increase in national gross product in 
previous period might increase the consumption of natural gas in 
current period. We expect a positive relationship between GNP(-l) 
and PG. 
3. The price of #2 oil (PO). 
As explained in the previous section, #2 oil is considered a 
substitute for natural gas. A positive relationship is expected 
between PG and PO. 
4. The price of electricity (PE). 
Electricity is also considered a substitute for natural gas. A 
positive relationship is expected between PG and PE. 
5. The dummy variable (DUMD). 
The demand for natural gas reaches its peak during the heating 
·season. To capture this effect, a dummy variable is employed; 0 for 
the 2nd and 3rd quarter of a year and 1 for 1st and 4th quarter of a 
year. We expect a positive relationship between PG and DUM. 
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6. The severance tax (TX). 
As was explained in discussion of the intrastate model, severance 
tax is part of the cost for natural gas producers. Hence, a positive 
relationship between PG and TX is expected. 
7. The operation costs (OC). 
As also explained in the previous section, the relationship 
between OC and PG is expected to be positive. 
8. The one-quarter-lagged wellhead price of natural gas 
(WP(- 1)). 
An increase in natural gas price of current period will stimulate 
the production of natural gas in next period. So will the increase in 
natural gas price of previous period stimulate current period's 
production, and drive down the price of natural gas in the current 
period. We expect there is a negative relationship between PG and 
WP(- 1). 
9. The number of producing wells of natural gas (PWG). 
The production ability of natural gas companies is not only 
1 imited by the total reserves available, in the long-run, but also 
limited by the number of producing wells of natural gas, in the 
short-run. More production wells means producers can produce more 
natural gas out of existing reserves, which in turn, drives down the 
price of natural gas. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship 
between PG and PWG. 
10. The total operating cost of natural gas wells (TC). 
This cost includes maintenance expenses and operating expenses of 
natural gas wells. If TC increases, total cost increases, the final 
price of natural gas paid by consumers, PG, also increases, hence, a 
positive relationship is expected between PG and TC. 
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The Test Statistic. The portion of severance tax that a state 
exports to other states depends on the estimated value of severance 
b2n tax coefficient, On, or The value of this coefficient is b2n -a4n • 
expected to fall between 0 and 1. 
To summarize, we developed two empirical models in this chapter 
based on demand and supply framework of natural gas. The ability of 
natural gas companies to shift some of the severance tax burden to 
consumers and the ability of state government to export natural gas 
severance taxes depends on the tax coefficient, D, in both markets. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES 
In Chapter III we presented the theoretical background of this 
study and in Chapter IV we described the empirical models. The 
empirical results, based on regression results, are presented in this 
chapter. The results of OLS linear regression are provided for both 
intrastate and interstate markets. 
Data Sources 
To estimate the severance tax incidence, annual data is used for 
intrastate market for the period 1960-1981, and quarterly data is used 
for interstate market for the period 1980:1-1984:4. The data sources 
of the demand for natural gas (D), the supply for natural gas (S), the 
market price of natural gas (PG), the wellhead price of natural gas 
(WP), the total reserves of natural gas (TR), the operation costs 
(OP), the number of producing wells of natural gas (PWG), and the 
total operating cost of natural gas wells (TC) for both markets are 
obtained from Natural Gas Monthly, Natural Gas Annual, Statistics 
on Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Companies, and State Energy Data 
Report Consumption Estimates (U.S. Department of Energy). 
The price of #2 oil (PO) and the price of electricity (PE), for 
both markets are obtained from Monthly Energy Review (U.S. 
Department of Energy). 
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The GNP implicit price deflator (1972 =100), the gross national 
product (GNP), and the gross state product (GSP) are obtained from 
various issues of the Survey of Current Business (U.S. Department of 
Commerce). 
The Empirical Results 
Intrastate Model 
The results of the multiple regression equations based on the 
intrastate model specified in Chapter IV are summarized in Table XIV. 
For each equation, the estimated regression coefficients of the 
variables are 1 isted in the table along with the coefficient of 
multiple determination (R2) and the value of the t-statistic for the 
coefficient. Significance tests have been performed on individual 
regression coefficients. One asterisk indicates the coefficient is 
significantly different from zero at the 90 percent level; two, the 95 
percent 1 evel; and three, the 99 percent level. F-tests are made to 
determine the overall significance of estimated equations. One, two, 
or three asterisks attached to the value of the F-ratio indicate 
alternative levels of significance as described earlier. 
For equation (5.1), the natural gas demand in Oklahoma, about 91 
percent of the variation in the demand for natural gas variable (0), 
can be explained by the five independent variables and the F-ratio is 
highly significant at the 99 percent level. For equation (5.2), the 
natural gas supply in Oklahoma, about 97 percent of the variation in 
the natural gas supply variable (S) can be explained by the three 
variables and the F-ratio is highly significant at the 99 percent 
TABLE XIV 
EQUATION ESTIMATES: INTRASTATE MODEL 
Equation (5.1) 
D = 11.28- 73.52PG + 0.840(-1) + 0.01GSP + 5.06PE - 15.79PO 
(0.02) (-0.28) (3.63)** (0.34) (0.01) (-0.40) 
R2 = 0.902 F = 27.75*** D-W = 1.67 
Equation (5.2) 
S = -150.68 + 291.24WP + 0.89S(-1) + 0.02TR(-1) 
(-0.89) (3.29)*** (2.67)** (17.42)*** 
R2 = 0. 966 F = 161. 06*** 0-W = 2.46 
Equation ( 5. 4) 
PG = -1.74- 0.000120(-1) + 0.00089GSP + 0.10746PE + 0.02988PO 
(-21.35)*** (-2.12)* (13.91)*** (15.49)*** (2.74)*** 
+ 0.9058TX + 0.72410C + 0.000006S(-1) + 0.00002TR(-1) 
(11.66)*** (1.86)* (.12) (8.15)*** 
R2 = .999 F = 1664.72*** 0-W = 3.15 
t-statistics are in parentheses 
* indicates significant at the 90 percent level. 
** indicates significant at the 95 percent level. 
***indicates significant at the 99 percent level. 
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level. In order to estimate the severance tax incidence, equation 
(5.4), the reduced form equation derived from (5.1) and (5.2), was 
tested. For equation (5.4), about 99 percent of the variation in the 
natural gas price variable (PG) can be explained by the eight 
independent variables. The coefficients of these variables have the 
predicted signs except for the one-year-lagged supply of natural gas 
variable, S(- 1 ), and the one-year-lagged reserves variable, 
TR(-1)" All coefficients, except for the one-year-lagged reserves 
variable, TR(- 1), are significant at the 90 percent level. 
Table XV shows the simple correlation coefficients between each 
independent variable in (5.4). As shown in Table XV, no serious 
multicollinearity problem exists. The Dubin-Watson tests were 
performed for all three equations. The results show that there is no 
serious serial correlation problem in (5.1), (5.2), and (5.4). 
As explained in the previous Chapter, the share of taxes passed 
forward to consumers is expressed as the estimated value of the 
severance tax coefficient. Hence, according to the regression 
results, about 91 percent of the severance tax is passed forward to 
resident buyers within Oklahoma, that is, for every one dollar natural 
gas severance tax revenue collected in intrastate market, about 91 
cents come from state residents of Oklahoma. 
The severance tax coefficient shows that a large protion of tax 
incidence falls on state residents of Oklahoma. That means the 
intrastate demand for natural gas might be relatively inelastic. this 
is true, if we take the logarithmic form of equation (5.1), the price 
e 1 ast i city of demand for natural gas is -0.27. 
Morgan and Mutt i (1981) point out that the field (wellhead) price 
of natural gas accounts for only about one-third of delivered price, 
D(-1) 
D(-1) 1.00 
GSP -0.13 
PE -0.04 
PO -0.02 
TX -0.29 
oc -0.00 
S(-1) -0.33 
TR(-1) 0.20 
TABLE XV 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFIC£NTS OF DETERMINANTS OF 
NATURAL GAS PRICE IN INTRASTATE MARKET 
GSP PE PO TX oc 
1.00 
0.23 1.00 
-0.65 0.02 1.00 
-0.61 -0.25 0.47 1.00 
-0.67 -0.49 -0.02 0.46 1.00 
-0.77 0.16 0.55 0. 76 0.50 
-0.02 -0.29 0.12 0. 36 0.93 
S(-1) 
1.00 
0.00 
TR(-1) 
1.00 
-......! 
....... 
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makes demand for natural gas fairly inelastic. Although substitute 
fuels are readily available in Oklahoma, as long as the prices for 
equivalent BTU content in alternative fuels are higher than the price 
of natural gas, which is the case in Oklahoma, most of the severance 
t ax o n n a t u r a 1 g a s w o u 1 d b e s h i f t e d f o r w a r d t o en d- user in the 
intrastate market. 
The rest of the tax, about 9 percent, must fall on the producers 
or mineral rights owners. Only when producers or mineral rights 
owners happen to be out-of-state residents, the tax will be exported. 
Hence, the maximum possibility for state government to export natural 
gas severance tax is 9 percent. 
The percentage of severance tax exported to federal taxpayers 
through the deductibility of federal taxes, if we apply the tax rates 
in Chapter III, is 56.8 percent. Hence, the maximum of total 
severance tax exported in this market is 65.8 percent (=.09 + .568), 
and the minimum is 56.8 percent. 
Interstate Model 
Table XVI summarizes the regression results for the interstate 
model. For each equation, the estimated regression coefficients of 
the variables, the R2 value, and the F-ratio are listed in the 
table. The t-ratio for each variable is listed in the parenthesis 
below each coefficient. One, two, or three asterisks attached to the 
value of the t-ratio and F-ratio indicate the level of significance as 
described in the previous ~ection. 
Equations (5.6) and (5.7) are the demand for and the supply of 
natural gas, respectively, in the interstate model. For equation 
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TABLE XVI 
EQUATION ESTIMATES: INTERSTATE MODEL 
Equation (5.6) 
0 = 10145.86 - 267.04PG + 0.70GNP - 1.40GNP(-1) - 1938.8PE 
(4.19)*** (-0.53) (1.29) (-2.96)*** (-2.94)*** 
+ 1243.68PO + 1458.95DUMD 
(0.66) (11.00)*** 
R2 = 0.955 F = 42.83*** D-W = 1.72 
Equation (5.7). 
S = 6944.09 + 3348.24WP - 5987.63WP(-1) - 0.06PWG + 0.58TC 
(11.20)*** (2.14)** (-4.01)*** (-2.64)** (3.63)*** 
R2 = 0.791 F = 13.25*** D-W = 1.13 
Equation (5.9) 
PG = -0.6819 - 0.00004GNP + 0.00015GNP(-1) + 0.23523PE + O.Ol731PO 
(-3.31)*** (-0.96) (3.46)*** (3.04)** (0.12) 
-0.02842DUMD + 0.96857TX + 0.875530C + 0.62046WP(-1) 
(-1.14) (7.12)*** (10.01)*** (4.13)*** 
+ O.OOOOOSPWG + 0.00014TC 
(1.81)* (1.66) 
R2 = 0.998 F = 341.51*** 
t-statistics are in parentheses 
* indicates significant at the 90 percent level. 
** indicates significant at the 95 percent level. 
*** indicates significant at the 99 percent level. 
0-W = 2.94 
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(5.6), about 96 percent of the variation in the demand for natural gas 
variable (0) can be explained by the six independent variables and the 
F-ratio is highly significant at the 99 percent level. For equation 
(5.7), about 79 percent of the variation in the supply of natural gas 
variable (S) can be explained by the three independent variables and 
the F-ratio is highly significant at the 99 percent level. Equation 
(5.9) was tested in order to estimate the severance tax burden that 
falls on residents outside Oklahoma. For equation (5.9), about 99 
percent of the v a r i at i on i n the n at u r a 1 g as p r i c e ( PG) can be 
explained by the ten independent variables and the F-ratio is highly 
significant at the 99 percent level. Five of the coefficients of 
these variables have the predicted signs and are significant at the 99 
percent level. It is noted that the severance tax variable (TX) and 
the operation cost variable (OC) appear to be two relatively most 
important variables in explaining the variation in the dependent 
v a r i a b 1 e , PG . 
As shown is Table XVII, there is no serious multicollinearity 
problem between each independent variable in (5.9). The Oubin-Watson 
tests show that no serious serial correlation problem exists in (5.6), 
( 5 • 7) , and ( 5 • 9 ) • 
With regard to the severance tax incidence, the regression 
coefficient of the severance tax variables (TX) shows that about 97 
percent of the severance tax burden is shifted to residents outside 
Oklahoma. 
The logarithmic form of equation (5.6) shows that the price 
elasticity of demand for natural gas is -0.08 in the interstate 
market. The reasons for this are similar to the ones for intrastate 
GNP 
GNP 1.00 
GNP(-1) -0.33 
PO 0.51 
PE -0.23 
DUMD 0.53 
TX -0.06 
oc -0.18 
WP(-1) 0.39 
PWG 0.47 
TC -0.26 
TABLE XVII 
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICENTS OF DETERMINANTS OF 
NATURAL GAS PRICE IN INTERSTATE MARKET 
GNP(-1) PO PE DUMD TX oc 
1.00 
0.03 1.00 
0.51 -0.04 1.00 
-0.59 0.23 -0.37 1.00 
-0.23 0.08 -0.48 -0.03 1.00 
0.24 0.42 0.35 -0.26 0.31 1.00 
-0.19 0.26 -0.13 0.51 -0.70 -0.37 
-0.19 0.08 -0.13 0.57 -0.51 -0.50 
0.05 -0.36 -0.29 -0.44 0. 71 -0.13 
WP ( -1) 
1.00 
0. 75 
0.51 
PWG 
1.00 
-0.49 
TC 
1.00 
-....! 
(.J1 
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market. Cheaper prices of natural gas makes natural gas a very 
competitive fuel in the national fuel market. In most of the U.S., 
the prices of natural gas are lower than the prices for alternative 
fuels of equivalent BTU content. Accesses for alternative fuels are 
not as easy as in the intrastate market. Even if alternative fuels 
are available, immediate switch to other kinds of fuel is quite 
difficult in the short run. All of these make the demand for natural 
gas even more inelastic in the interstate market. Hence, in the short 
run, large portions of severance taxes imposed by gas-producing states 
could be shifted forward to end-users in the interstate market. 
The tax that is not shifted forward to consumers must be shifted 
backward to producers or mineral rights owners. Hence, the maximum of 
this portion of tax exported is 3 percent. 
The percentage of severance tax exported to federal taxpayers 
though the deductibility of federal taxes, again, if we apply the tax 
rates in Chapter III, is 56.8 percent. Hence, the maximum of total 
severance tax exported in this market is 156.8 percent (=.97 + .03 + 
.568), and the minimum is 153.8 percent (=.97 + .568). 
The 1 arge value of severance tax coefficients in both markets 
imply that supply of natural gas might be relatively elastic. As was 
mentioned in Chapter II, the interstate natural gas prices were 
subject to relatively stringent cost-oriented pricing standards and 
not allowed to increase as rapidly as oil prices in the early 1970•s. 
The low-cost natural gas dominated the supply of natural gas at that 
time. Only recently, after the NGPA allowed some categories of gas to 
be deregulated, have costs of finding and producing gas been rising 
rapidly at the margin. Hence, the relatively elastic supply curve is 
a reasonable assumption during the study period. 
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In 1984, Oklahoma sold 1,161,866 million cubic feet of natural 
gas to other states through interstate pipeline companies and consumed 
652,953 mill ion cubic feet of natural gas within the state. Hence, 
over all the maximum of total natural gas severance tax exported in 
the year 1984 is 
( 658) * 652,953 (1 568)* 1,161,866 = 1 2406 
. (652,953 + 1,161,866) + . (652,953 + 1,161,866) • ; 
and the minimum is 
* 652,953 ( )* 1,161,866 = 1 189 (- 568) (652,953 + 1,161,866) + 1· 538 {652,953 + 1,161,866) . 
That is, about 119 to 124 percent of Oklahoma•s natural gas severance 
tax was exported in 1984. 
Other Specifications 
Besides the variables in equations (4.4) and (4.9), some other 
variables were also used to estimate the tax incidence. 
The Price of Coal (PC) 
Coal is considered a substitute for natural gas. A positive 
relationship is expected between PG and PC. Equation (4.4) becomes 
PG = 
+ 
D{-1) + a4 PE + 
b2-a3 
(4.4)* 
The empirical estimate of (4.4)* is: 
PG = -1.64 - 0.00040(-1) + 0.00086GSP + 0.10179PE + 0.03674PO 
(12.36)*** (-0.76) (11.84)*** (10.84)*** (2.75)*** 
- 0.00205PC + 0.8971TX + 0.64230C - 0.000025(-1) 
(-0.72) (10.19)*** (1.45) (-0.38) 
-0.00001TR(-1) 
(5.45)*** 
R2 = 999 . F = 1169. 57*** 0-W = 2.70 
Equation (4.9) was also expressed as: 
PG = a1n:..b1n + 
b2n-a4n 
The empirical estimate of (4.9)* is: 
GNP(-1) + 
PG = -0.6262 - 0.00005GNP + 0.00015GNP(-1) + 0.25151PE 
(-2.28)** (-0.93) (3.15)*** (2.64)** 
+ 0.02489PO - 0.00440PC - 0.030280UMD + 0.97627TX 
(0.16) (-0.34) (-1.12) (6.68)*** 
+ 0.885810C + 0.60264WP(-1) + O.OOOOOSPWG + 0.00014TC 
(9.05)*** (3.59)*** (1.56) (1.59) 
R2 = .998 F = 276.07*** 0-W = 2.99 
PO 
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As the empirical estimates show, the price of coal in both 
markets does not change the empirical results of equations (4.4) and 
(4.9) much. In both markets, PC does not improve R2 and has an 
insignificant coefficient. 
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The Interest Rate (INT) 
Higher prices will encourage production, as will rising interest 
rates, since income earned from the sale of natural gas can be 
invested and earn higher returns elsewhere. A negative relationship 
is expected between the interest rate and natural gas price since an 
increase in natural gas production will cause natural gas prices to 
fall. Equation (4.2) becomes: 
S = b1 + o2WP + D3S(-1) + b4TR(-1) + b5INT + u2 
The empirical estimate of equation (4.2)* is: 
S = -519.44 - 6707WP + 0.83S(-l) + 0.03TR(-1) + 374.41INT 
(-1.49) (-0.22) (11.98)*** (2.56)** (1.21) 
R2 = 0.97 F = 124.39*** D-W = 2.23 
(4.2)* 
However, the negative sign of WP contradicts our production theory, 
and the interest rate coefficient shows no statistical significance. 
Hence, we dropped !NT from the model. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter summarizes the methodology and empirical results of 
the study. Some suggestions are made for future research based on the 
findings of this study. 
SufliTlary 
Severance taxes have played a more and more important role in 
many states • tax structures. The wide use of taxes on energy 
resources to finance state government activities may reflect the fact 
that state governments believe that a portion of these taxes can be 
exported to other states. Despite the theoretical importance of 
exportabi 1 ity for a state, little empirical research has been done to 
estimate the geographic incidence of particular severance taxes for 
particular states. The main objective of the present study has been 
to estimate the incidence of Oklahoma's severance tax on natural gas 
on consumers in Oklahoma and other states. To do this, two empirical 
models, an intrastate model and an interstate model, were developed 
based on Shelton and Vogt •s (1982) coal severance tax model. Both 
models are based on a formal demand and supply framework which 
incorporates the most important determinants of the demand for and the 
supply of natural gas. Two reduced form equations derived from these 
models were estimated, using ordinary least square techniques. The 
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intrastate model was estimated for the period 1960-1981, using annual 
data. The interstate model was estimated for the period 
1980:1-1984:4, using quarterly data. 
By examining the evidence obtained from the empirical models, and 
based on the example in Chapter III, we find: 
1. About 91 percent of the Oklahoma severance tax revenue 
collected from intrastate natural gas sales is paid by Oklahoma 
consumers. Nine percent of this tax revenue is paid by producers and 
mineral rights owners, only some of whom may be non-Oklahoma 
residents. Thus, less than 9 percent of this portion of the tax may 
be exported. 
2. About 97 percent of the Oklahoma severance tax revenue 
collected from interstate natural gas sales is paid by out-of-state 
consumers. Three percent of this tax revenue is paid by producers and 
mineral rights owners. Since some of these may be non-Oklahoma 
residents, over 97 percent of this portion of the tax may be exported. 
3. Over one-half of the taxes collected in both markets may be 
exported to federal taxpayers through federal tax deductibility. 
However, we have not estimated the actual percentage exported in this 
way. 
4. Given the distribution of natural gas sales between 
intrastate and interstate markets in 1984, Oklahoma may have exported 
over 100 percent of its total natural gas severance taxes to residents 
of other states and federal taxpayers. 
The empirical findings of this study show that a very large 
portion of Oklahoma natural gas severance taxes levied on interstate 
sales are exported. These results would follow from small price 
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elasticity of demand, large price elasticity of supply, or 
institutional features which facilitated a fairly complete 
pass-through of taxes. The logarithmic form of the demand function 
suggests a low price elasticity, and thereby suggests a high price 
elasticity of supply. We have not examined the market•s institutional 
or regulatory features carefully enough to determine their role. 
Although some empirical estimates of the exportation of Oklahoma 
severance taxes have been done by several public finance economists, 
one of the features that makes this study different from other studies 
is that we have estimated the incidence of the Ok 1 ahoma severance tax 
on natural gas through the use of a market equilibrium model. In this 
way, the severance tax has been treated as a difference between the 
market price and the wellhead price. This magnitude is interpreted as 
reflecting the true ability of producers and consumers to avoid paying 
the tax. Through the use of a demand and supply framework, many 
important factors, such as changes in economic activity and seasonal 
fluctuations in demand for natural gas, could be incorporated in the 
models as determinants of the magnitude of the severance tax that fell 
on consumers. 
Another feature of this study is that it not only provides an 
estimate of the tax exportation abi 1 ity of state government of 
Oklahoma but it also provides an estimate of the tax share that fell 
on residents within Oklahoma. This is important to Oklahoma tax 
pol icy makers. Exportability is an important factor in evaluating a 
tax, but so is equity. Our empirical results show that most of the 
severance taxes collected from interstate markets could be exported. 
In this way, the severance tax meets the exportation criterion of a 
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good tax. On the other hand, a large portion of tax also fell on 
residents of Oklahoma. If most of the natural gas consumed in 
Oklahoma were used by low-income residents, the tax would be 
regressive. It then would not meet the vertical equity criterion of a 
good tax. We do not know the distribution of expenditures for natural 
gas by income class in Oklahoma. However, the findings of this study 
provide valuable information for state tax policy makers trying to 
formulate a balanced tax policy in terms of both exportability and 
vertical equity. 
Future Research 
Perhaps the weakest link in our analysis is the use of national 
production cost data, rather than cost data specific to Oklahoma. 
Lack of data, however, precluded us from separating Oklahoma•s natural 
gas production from that of the other major producing states and from 
applying production costs specific to natural gas production in 
Oklahoma. This is clearly a problem which needs future research. As 
discussed in Chapter III, market dominance can result from the 
coordinated actions of several jointly-dominant states. Thus, the 
exportation ability of the state government of Oklahoma might have 
been overestimated. Only a future study built around a 
multi-jurisdictional model will tell us this for sure. Morgan and 
Mutti (1985) have argued that if most of the severance taxes are 
passed forward to consumers rather than backward to stockholders, this 
may mobilize political support for severance tax limitation bill such 
as t h o s e f o r we s t e r n c o a l p r o d u c i n g s t a t e s • T h us , it wo u l d be 
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of continuing interest to the state government of Oklahoma to update 
this estimate of exportation ability. 
L a c k o f d at a a 1 s o p r e c 1 u d e d t h e a c c u r at e e s t i m a t e of tax 
exportation through backward shifting of Oklahoma natural gas 
severance taxes. As the empirical results show, this portion of tax 
is quite small in both markets. Hence, this omission does not harm 
our empirical findings seriously. However, the portion of tax 
exported to federal taxpayers via federal tax deductability could be 
quite large. Mutti and Morgan (1983) have argued that any decline in 
federal tax revenues will result in a reduction in federal government 
expenditures, an increase in other federal taxes, or an increase in 
the federal debt. Each of these alternatives further redistributes 
the tax within the nation. Thus, a multilateral analysis which 
explicitly incorporates these choices may be well worth the effort. 
This would be important for state tax policy makers, as well, as a 
means of considering the feedback of a severance tax in a broader 
context. 
It would also be worth the effort to distinguish the demand for 
natural gas among the various end-use sectors. The theoretical 
analysis of this study shows that the incidence of tax depends on the 
elasticity of demand of individual users and the price of the 
appropriate alternative fuel available to each user. Since user's 
abilities to switch to other fuels differ, so do the elasticities of 
demand for natural gas in the various end-use sectors. Hence, the 
incidence that falls on end-use sectors is also different. In the 
present study, we have used aggregate demand rather than individual 
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end-use sector demands, and our empirical results may not be accurate 
representations of the incidence for any particular end-use sector. 
That is, our estimates may be an overestimate of the industrial 
sectors' tax burden, and an underestimate of the residential sector's 
tax burden, since the industrial users can switch to other fuels more 
easily than can residential users. This has implications for policy 
makers concerned about vertical equity, and a further study of tax 
incidence for individual end-use sectors is suggested. 
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